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Facing up to the dangers of the intolerant university: Bird on an ethics wire

Facing up to the dangers of the intolerant university: Bird on an ethics wire_pic

In this edited excerpt from her Research and Society Lecture to the 2008 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, ethicist Margaret Somerville argues that universities are becoming forums of intolerance. Keeping the university as an intellectually open and respectful place is critical, she says, to finding the “shared ethics” essential to maintaining healthy, pluralistic democracies.

by Margaret Somerville

 
Whom we bond with in terms of shared values and the way in which we find and affirm values is now undergoing major change. The current challenge is to find shared values that can allow us to be both a “me” and a “we” in our wired, interconnected, multicultural, pluralistic world.

To achieve that duality, we will need to balance the needs and rights of individuals and those of the community. In the recent past, depending on our own values orientation, many of us chose between strong individualism and strong communitarianism, with the former prevailing in Western democracies over the last 40 years. Today, we need a new integration of the “me” and the “we”, which might be emerging as a “third way”, one manifestation of which is the concept of “retro-progressive values”.

That concept captures the idea that we make a serious error in simply abandoning traditional values for what we see as “avant garde” ones. We need to balance and blend the old and the new. That requires identifying traditional values we still need and integrating with them the new ones that will guide us into the future. To do that we must engage in an ongoing process that I call “searching for a shared ethics,” which I discuss a little later.

In short, “retro-progressive values” represent a combination of the ancient wisdom and the new knowledge that we need if we and our world are to survive. It captures the wisdom of the First Nations, who look back seven generations (consulting human memory, that is, history) and look forward seven generations (using imagination as a way of knowing) in making important communal decisions. While much progress is good, worshipping it—that is, uncritically acclaiming the new and unhesitatingly abandoning the old—is not be the best way to survive into the future, either physically or morally.

Thinking about a shared ethics caused me to remember a cartoon I’ve often laughed at. It shows a line of birds on a wire all facing forward, except for one bird which faces in the opposite direction with his back to the viewer. The bird next to him says, “Can’t we talk about it?” This image carries a powerful message in relation to ethics: First, that in searching for ethics often we are, indeed, balancing on a wire, in the sense that we must deal with complexity and uncertainty—we are in ethically grey areas. And second, it captures the idea that we need to talk to each other to find ethics and that we need to start from our agreements rather than our disagreements.

I believe it’s important to protect our universities as spaces where open dialogue can be engaged in, especially in relation to ethics, and for us to be aware that those spaces are at substantial risk of being shut down in some of our universities, because of the impact of political correctness on Canadian university campuses.

Let me, however, make three preliminary points:
  • First, I’m using the term “politically correct” as a shorthand term to cover a variety of identity-based social movements and the neo-liberal values that they espouse. I am not using it, as can sometimes happen, to describe people or their views or values derogatorily, which is not to say I agree with all of them.
  • Second, I believe we are all people who want to avoid harm and do good, but when our values conflict, we don’t always agree which of those two should be given priority in order to achieve that outcome—and that disagreement engenders conflict among us. It is essential, no matter how intense that conflict, that we always act with mutual respect.
  • Third, we should keep in mind the concept of “moral regret.” It requires that when, for reasons of ethics, something we do or stand for offends or hurts others—for instance, my opposition to same-sex marriage—we should deeply regret that our doing so causes others pain. It is sometimes said that all movements go too far—but that might be necessary for them to have any impact at all. However, they need to pull back or be pulled back at a certain point, if they are not to do more harm than good. My specific concern is the negative impact of the various politically-correct movements on freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of conscience, and academic freedom in our universities.

The paradox of intense tolerance
Many people are expressing their deep concern in these regards with the question, “What’s happening in our universities?” One such happening is that an extreme of moral relativism is leading to a loss, on the part of university students, of substantive values, certainly shared ones, or even ethics nihilism, in the sense that ethics becomes nothing more than personal preferences.

Post-modernism is now de rigueur in the humanities and social sciences. Post-modernists adopt a relativistic approach. In ethics, moral relativism translates into a view that there is no grounded truth; rather what is ethical is simply a matter of personal judgment and preference. Moral relativism means that values are all of equal worth, and which ones take priority, when they conflict, is merely a matter of each person’s perception and preference. That approach deconstructs values—they lose their substance. The result, paradoxically, is that “the equality of all values” itself, becomes the supreme value. This stance ultimately leads, at least in theory, to extreme or intense tolerance as the “most equal” of equal values. But does that happen in practice?

That is where political correctness enters the picture. It excludes politically incorrect values from the “all values are equal” stable. The intense moral relativists will tolerate all values except those they deem to be politically incorrect—which just happen to be the ones that conflict with their values.

Political correctness operates by shutting down non-politically correct people’s freedom of speech. Anyone who challenges the politically correct stance is, thereby, automatically labeled as intolerant, a bigot, or hatemonger. The substance of their arguments against a politically correct stance is not addressed; rather people labeled as politically incorrect are, themselves, attacked as being intolerant and hateful simply for making those arguments. This derogatorily -label-the-person-and-dismiss-them-on-the-basis-of-that-label approach is intentionally used as a strategy to suppress strong arguments against any politically correct stance and, also, to avoid dealing with the substance of these arguments.

It is important to understand the strategy employed: speaking against same-sex marriage, for example, is not characterized as speech; rather, it is characterized as a discriminatory act against homosexuals and, therefore, a breach of human rights or even a hate crime. Consequently, it is argued that protections of freedom of speech do not apply.

Another part of the same strategy is to reduce to two the choices of position that are available: one has to choose, for example, between being either pro-choice on abortion and for respect for women and their rights, or pro-life and against respect for women and their rights. The possibility of being pro-women and their rights and pro-life is eliminated. That is not accidental; it is central to the strategy that has been successfully used in Canada to maintain the complete void with respect to having any law governing abortion.

Political correctness is being used as a form of fundamentalism, and fundamentalisms—especially “warring” fundamentalisms as manifest, for example, in the battles between religious fundamentalists and neo-atheist fundamentalists, such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. Fundamentalists are a grave danger to democracy and, hence, to our Western democratic societies because they vastly widen the divides between us. They create an unbridgeable “us” and “them,” when what we need is a “we.”

We need to look at what “pure” moral relativism and intense tolerance, as modified by political correctness, mean in practice. So let ‘s look at the suppression of pro-life groups and pro-life speech on Canadian university campuses. Whatever one’s views on abortion, we should all be worried about such developments. Pro-choice students are trying to stop pro-life students from participating in the collective conversation on abortion that should take place. In fact, they don’t want any conversation, alleging that to question whether we should have any law on abortion is, in itself, unacceptable.

In some instances some people are going even further: they want to force physicians to act against their conscience under threat of being in breach of human rights or subject to professional disciplinary procedures for refusing to do so. The Ontario Human Rights Commission recently advised the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario to this effect.

Political correctness is being used to try to impose certain views and even actions that breach rights to freedom of conscience; to shut down free speech; and to contravene academic freedom. I do not need to emphasize the dangers of this in universities. The most fundamental precept on which a university is founded is openness to ideas and knowledge from all sources.

The further concern is that shutting down freedom of speech in our universities might be an example of a much larger problem outside the universities. We can’t hold a society together in the long-term without shared values; that is, without a societal-cultural paradigm. We need a story about ourselves that supports our most important values and beliefs, one we tell each other and all buy into, to form the glue that holds us together. Tolerance alone, especially if unbalanced by other important values, is nowhere near enough to be that story.

To ensure our story does not disintegrate, we must engage in respectful conversation. The public needs academics to speak freely—respectfully, openly, and without threat of repercussions—about contentious, important, societal problems. That requires academic freedom, which is meant primarily for the benefit of the public by allowing academics to feel confident that they can speak the truth, as they see it, to power.

Our universities should be models for narrowing the divides that separate us, not for widening them, as presently seems to be happening. In our contemporary pluralistic democracies, we must engage in respectful conversation across those divides. To do so, we need to search for a shared ethics.

Searching for a shared ethics
Just as the birds on the ethics wire are not limited by boundaries, we need to be able to cross our traditional divides, if we are to find this shared ethics. Because the concept of a shared ethics is central to protecting the world of the future, I believe, it is important that I explain what I mean by that concept.

First, let me note what I don’t mean by a shared ethics. I do not mean that we will have one universal ethic. Nor do I mean that we will all just accept one another’s ethics—what is called an “ethical pluralism.” I do not accept moral relativism, which argues that there is no grounded truth or deep base to ethics and, therefore, everyone’s views on ethics are as good as anyone else’s. Nor do I accept ethical cosmopolitanism, if that means that we must be equally concerned for and equally bonded to everyone.

Humans have evolved to bond to special others, such as family, friends or pets, or to a homeland. We bond more strongly or in a different way inside these parameters than outside them. Ethics must accommodate those realities.

Second, we must be realistic and recognize that groups at either end of a broad spectrum of values will never buy into a shared ethics. However, the vast majority of people can find common ground. Universities are one of the most important places in which to learn and model how we can do that. That means we must actively preserve them as intellectually open spaces.

In order to do that, we need to be careful not to confuse liberal values with open-mindedness or traditional or conservative values with close-mindedness, as is common in the mainstream media. People can have liberal values and be close-minded and conservative values and open-minded.

Third, I propose that we must start our conversation from consensus and move to disagreement, not, as we currently do, focus entirely on our disagreements. That will set a different tone for our interaction. Searching for a shared ethics from that starting point will help us to emphasize what we have in common and allow us to experience belonging to the same moral community. In the past, when we took commonality for granted, we could afford the luxury of focusing on our disagreements, but this is no longer our situation.

Fourth, we must recognize that we are all trying to do the right thing, trying to be ethical, and where we disagree is what that is. The vast majority of people are not evil. That designation must be reserved for cases in which there is no doubt it applies.

Fifth, we need to balance intense individualism with a robust concern for the community, and we need to consider the collective impact of our individual decisions. In our interconnected world, an order unavoidably emerges from thousands of individual decisions. For example, Quebec is proposing to offer all pregnant women screening for Down’s Syndrome. Whether or not, as individuals, we think that is good and ethical, the cumulative effect at the societal level of each woman’s individual decision (including the decisions not to abort when the fetus is “normal”) is to implement a 21st Century form of eugenics. Only the decision not to abort when the fetus has Down’s Syndrome is not a eugenic decision.

Likewise, we need to extend the scope of our analyses to consider the needs and rights of future generations. And we must hold in trust for them, not just our physical world, but our metaphysical one—the values, principles, beliefs, and stories that create and represent the “human spirit,” that which makes us human. In light of the unprecedented power of the new techno-science to radically alter the nature of Nature, including human nature, we must address the question, “What is the essence of our humanness that we must not destroy?”, which is a far from easy question to answer.

Sixth, not only can we, but we must, cross the secular/religious divide, the science/religion divide and the divide between religions, if we are to find a shared ethics. This is where I believe both the fundamentalist religious people and the fundamentalist neo-atheists are wrong because they demand that we choose between religion and science. We must accommodate both.

Some would like to reduce religion to being seen as nothing more than a personal fantasy or superstition. But that’s not realistic. At best it will fail; at worst it will do serious harm because it will exacerbate the acrimony of the values conflicts and make it more likely, not less likely, that religion will become a focus of serious conflict. Also, because culture and religion are linked, even within democratic, multicultural, pluralistic Western societies, it will increase the number and intensity of the current values clashes and may contribute to culture wars.

Shared ethics means establishing a base or starting point that consists of ethical concepts and values that we already share and on which we can build; I am not suggesting that we all have to agree on everything. Rather, I’m looking for limited areas where some of us can agree. Who constitutes a group will vary with each issue. The idea is to find what we have in common ethically so that we can experience ourselves as belonging to the same moral community. As those experiences accumulate we will be more able to find common ground.

Engaging in a collective search to find those limited areas is likely to produce greater agreement. Getting all of us to agree on everything is a utopian goal, not a realistic one. Unrealizable goals create a loss of hope, and cynicism about ethics and the need to be ethical.

I am proposing a thick overlap of borders concept—that we might start from different poles, but there is a big (one hopes) overlap of common territory in the middle, in which we all are, in fact, “at home.” Common humanity and universal responsibility link us. But much of the time we act as if this is not the case—we are in denial as individuals and societies. We need to search for a shared ethics for an interdependent world. The survival of the world of the future, at least as the kind of world most of us would want to live in, may well depend on our success in achieving the goal of finding a shared ethics.

As academics, especially in our engagements with students, we have an enormous privilege and responsibility to contribute to realizing that goal and serious obligations to ensure that we do not do anything to thwart it. That means we must hold both our physical and metaphysical worlds in trust for future generations, which does not mean that we must not change them. Rather, we have to be certain that if we do so, we are ethically justified in making those changes.

Can the future trust us? AM

Margaret Somerville is Samuel Gale Professor in the Faculty of Law and a professor in the Faculty of Medicine at McGill University and is the founding director of the McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law. In 2004, she received the UNESCO Avicenna Prize for Ethics in Science and in 2006 delivered the prestigious Massey Lectures.
 
 
COMMENTS:

Paul Nathanson:
I was glad to read this debate over postmodernism and its handmaiden, political correctness, although I remain pessimistic about its outcome. Academics should take Somerville’s argument seriously, but neither Shallit nor Redding does so.

Shallit complains that Somerville wants religion to have a "place at the table," is facile. If this "table" refers to the public square of a democracy, then religious people clearly should be there—not because they believe what others either do or don’t believe but because they're citizens (let alone people). For Shallit, people have a right to say what they want as long as what they say makes sense to "us."

As for Redding, he’s correct, on technical grounds, when he argues that Somerville’s terminology is imprecise (though not because she’s "pretending" to find support for her argument about postmodernism). Okay, she uses “relativism” according to common parlance. This means that all values are of equal importance, which implies that all values are equally unimportant and therefore that no values are important. But strictly speaking, "relativism" refers to relative importance, not equal importance. In that case, even relativists could say that their own ideas are more important or valuable or whatever than those of other people. Even so, Redding is quibbling. The main problem here is that Somerville has linked "moral relativism" (in the common sense) with postmodernism. As Redding points out, that’s not true—at least, in my opinion, not in theory. Postmodernists don't claim that all ideas are equally valuable, which is why Redding says that a closer examination of postmodernist theory would reveal "the precise opposite" of what Somerville claims. On the contrary, they claim that all ideas are equally not valuable and therefore fair game for deconstruction. In fact, however, they never take that claim to its logical conclusion; they stop deconstructing, after all, when it comes to their own preferred ideas—ones that are relatively better than any others and thus, for all intents and purposes, objectively true. This is precisely why Redding defends relativism (in his correct but pedantic sense). Otherwise, how could he defend his own political or ideological preferences? The problem here is intellectual dishonesty, I think, not moral relativism (in either sense).

Redding is definitely not correct, however, in arguing that etiquette "simply translates into common human decency." Decency relies on justice. And justice cannot rely on double standards. The problem with "political correctness" (and some forms of etiquette) is that it does rely on double standards. It’s fundamentally unjust to argue that we should treat some people (such as women in general) with respect but others (such as men in general) with contempt. That’s self-righteousness or even revenge, not justice. If we really want to an etiquette that's worthy of a just society, and not merely a way of silencing adversaries, we'll have to do a whole lot better than that. And we could begin, once again, by being honest.

Somerville’s basic argument is worthy, as I say, of careful consideration. She could refine it, however, in a few ways. She writes that "the vast majority of people are not evil," for instance, and I agree. The alternative, after all, is cynicism. But I suggest that no one is innately evil (or good, for that matter). There are only ordinary people who sometimes do evil (or good) things. And yes, that includes the Nazis. To argue otherwise is to make an ontological or even metaphysical statement—one that undermines moral agency and thus moral responsibility. If people cannot choose between good and evil, after all, how can we hold them accountable for doing evil?

Moreover, Somerville refers to a conflict between "the rights of individuals and those of the community" but without defining the latter. It could refer to society as a whole, but it could refer also—and I think that it does for many people—to one segment of society: something that's between "me" and "we" on the political continuum. Libertarians really are intensely individualistic, it’s true, but their opposing counterparts are not intensely collectivistic in the usual sense of that word. Ideological feminists (as distinct from egalitarian ones) and others who support identity politics do not care about society as a whole more than they do about any individual; they care about their own groups more than they do about either society as a whole or any individual (which is one reason for many feminists complaints about ideological forms of feminism). Somerville writes that ethics, for some people, "becomes nothing more than personal preferences." Yes, but it becomes for many other people nothing more than group preferences. This is a recipe for polarization, not dialogue, and eventually for societal fragmentation.

McGill University
 
Art Redding:
Margaret Somerville's article is wrong on nearly every count. The idea that all humans are equal and that every choice is personal is NOT a postmodern idea (rather, these ideas are associated with humanism). Postmodernism (if there is a such a thing) involves a critique of the humanist fetishization of personhood. Somerville might begin by engaging critics who have theorized postmodernism (Lyotard, Soja, Jameson, Harvey, etc.) or who might possibly be considered postmodern thinkers (Derrida, Foucault, Butler, Lyotard, etc.). What she will find is the exact opposite of what she pretends to find. Instead, she misappropriately caricatures and lampoons postmodernism, attacking it not for what it is, but for what she mistakenly believes it to be. Cliches, sloppy thinking, imprecise terminology and misguided right-wing stereotypes don't cut it. Under the cover of ethical thinking, this essay presents merely another predictable and tiresome jeremiad.

Political correctness is no more than etiquette; it simply translates into common human decency (avoid racial slurs, don't make fun of the overweight and disabled, etc.). Surely we don't want to return to a university that discriminates against women and minorities. Or do we?

Moral relativism does not mean all views are the same--again, quite the opposite. An ant is small relative to a dog, a dog is small relative to a giraffe, and a giraffe is small relative to a whale. Does this mean all the animals are the same size? So, too, with morals. Relativism may be (but is not necessarily) anti-foundational, but it enables rather than hinders our capacity for discrimination and ethical judgment. Values are not absolute (just as a colour, say "blue," is not absolute, but relative (complementary to orange, variably distinct from aquamarine, sea-green, indigo, etc.)

Somerville certainly has a right to her opinions (as an anarchist, I am against all marriages myself--I consider my love life none of the state's business). But we academics also have a responsibility for clarity of thought and precision of terminology.

Department of English, York University
 
Jeff Small:
I commend Professor Somerville for her eloquent and cogent commentary on the duplicity and perils of moral relativism both in regard to academic freedom and society at large. Her visionary perspectives on searching for a shared ethics, embracing retro-progressive values, and expressing moral regret deserve careful attention.
I would also like to thank Academic Matters for publishing the article in the first place.

Associate Professor, School of Audiology and Speech Sciences, University of British Columbia
 
Margaret Somerville:
Professor Shallit seems not to understand an ethically and legally important distinction relevant to the example he outlines – a distinction which, I might add, is studied by Philosophy 101 students.

A physician’s refusal to treat a patient based on who they are (for example, a refusal to treat a black man or a lesbian woman, because of his race or her sexual orientation) is unethical and discrimination. But that is different from a refusal to treat a patient based on the nature of the action the patient wishes the physician to cooperate in, which the physician believes is ethically or morally wrong. Such cooperation would make the physician a moral agent who is complicit in the wrongdoing he believes is involved.

So, if a physician believes IVF (in vitro fertilisation),itself, is immoral or unethical, or that some uses of it are, for instance, using donated gametes or providing IVF to people who do not intend the resulting child to be reared by both a mother and a father, the physician has a right to refuse to be involved in these situations and such a refusal is not unethical and should not be characterized as legally cognizable discrimination.

As the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms provides, everyone, in a free and democratic society, must be accorded the right to freedom of conscience and belief, which, of course, must be genuinely held conscientious or moral beliefs, and freedom of religion. These rights may only be limited by law and to an extent that is reasonable in a free and democratic society. Forcing physicians to act contrary to their consciences would only fulfill this requirement in the rare circumstances that the intervention was required to save a person’s life or avoid a serious risk to health and there was no other alternative to the physician’s intervening.

In Canada, people advocating the same approach as Professor Shallit to respect (or, more accurately, disrespect) for freedom of conscience on controversial social-ethical-values issues, such as access to reproductive technologies, abortion and so on, are not content with having the freedom to act according to their values; they want to make others, for whom it would be a breach of their consciences and values, act likewise. And they want to have their beliefs and values publicly affirmed. Obtaining official rulings from human rights tribunals that physicians have no freedom of conscience protection regarding these issues helps them to establish that their values should predominate as the societal norms.

In short, these people claim freedom of values and belief for themselves, but refuse to respect others’ freedom. That’s why they will not tolerate respect for freedom of conscience, and certainly not as the norm, which is what it should be. No matter what our values or views, we should all be concerned by such totalitarianism and fundamentalism.

To another issue: Professor Shallit is not correct that I "label and dismiss" "Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens as "neo-atheist fundamentalists" without addressing their arguments". I have addressed their arguments elsewhere (see, for example, "Searching for a Shared Ethics – Challenging Richard Dawkins’ ‘The God Delusion’", in Anne Henderson (ed), The Sydney Papers (The Sydney Institute; Sydney), 2007;19(3): 20-35). And they call themselves atheists, and they and others are extensively referred to as a group as the "neo-atheists".

I use the description fundamentalist because I believe atheism is a "secular religion" and that neo-atheists and religious fundamentalists are similar.

Like all fundamentalists the neo-atheists, first, want to impose their views on everyone else.

Second, like all fundamentalists, they take an either/or approach – either my beliefs or yours; either science or religion, either reason or Faith - when we need to accommodate both sides of each of these divides in our pluralistic, multicultural world.

Fundamentalists, whether secular or religious, seek to reconcile what they see as the conflicts between the two elements that make up each of these pairings, by dropping one or the other of them. Richard Dawkins’ call for the elimination of religion demonstrates such a choice on his part - as is also true of Professor Shallit’s letter .

And, third, fundamentalists engage in proselytizing in an effort to have their views prevail, for instance, the atheists’ recent advertising campaign on buses in some Canadian cities.

Finally, whatever one’s personal views on religion, it must be accommodated if we are to create the kind of world most reasonable people would want to live in. Moreover, Professor Shallit’s statement that only "rational and verifiable thought" merits being taken into account is contradicted, at least in relation to ethical analysis, by recent research published in Nature.

It showed that people with damage to the parts of their brains that process emotions, but who have intact centres for rational judgment, made ethically inappropriate decisions. To quote: "The study provides evidence that [good] moral decision-making is based on emotion as well as rational thought" ("The Moral Brain" Nature, May 2007). An even more recent study, also reported in Nature, shows that people with damage to the front part of their brain – the cortex – have "an abnormally utilitarian pattern of moral judgments". So, might religion be one way in which, traditionally, we’ve avoided the danger of not balancing our rational cognition, important as that is, with other important human ways of knowing?

Samuel Gale Professor, Faculty of Law; professor, Faculty of Medicine, McGill University; founding director, McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law
 
Jeffrey Shallit:
Margaret Somerville's piece fails to convince on multiple levels.

She compares the suppression of speech on campus (which I decry) with the Ontario Human Rights Commission "forc[ing] physicians to act against their conscience", presumably in reference to physicians who refuse to refer lesbian couples for in vitro fertilization. But these two cases are not in the least comparable. In the latter, the question is whether physicians have the right to shirk their professional duty and engage in discrimination simply by calling their view "religious". Would Margaret Somerville also support the right of a physician to refuse to treat black patients, because the physician belongs to an Aryan church that views blacks as subhuman? I doubt it. Then how can she support the "right" of physicians to treat lesbian couples differently from heterosexual couples?

Somerville decries the tendency of the Left to dismiss those holding opposing views as "intolerant, a bigot, or hatemonger", and she says "[t]he substance of their arguments ... is not addressed". But she behaves in exactly the same way when she dismisses Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitches as "neo-atheist fundamentalists" without addressing their arguments.

Somerville thinks religion deserves an equal place at the table as science. But why? Why should belief systems that rely on ancient dogma and maintain nonsensical, unverifiable, and contradictory beliefs deserve the same status as rational and verifiable thought?

If Somerville's commentary is considered an example of award-winning ethicism, something is seriously wrong with the state of Canadian philosophy.

Professor, Computer Science, University of Waterloo
 

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